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IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT JACKSON 
Chris Hardin, 
Employee, 
v. 
Dewayne's Quality Metals, 
Employer, 
And 
Accident Fund, 
Insurance Carrier. 
) Docket No.: 2015-07-0067 
) 
) State File No.: 28439-2015 
) 
) Judge Allen Phillips 
) 
) 
) 
EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL BENEFITS AND 
DENYING TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS 
This matter came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge upon the 
Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the Employee, Chris Hardin, pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. Hardin seeks medical and 
temporary disability benefits for an alleged gradual injury to both arms. The employer, 
Dewayne's Quality Metals, contends that Mr. Hardin did not sustain an injury arising 
primarily out of his employment. 1 For the following reasons, the Court determines Mr. 
Hardin carried his burden of proof and demonstrated that he is entitled to medical 
benefits for evaluation of his alleged injuries, but that he is not entitled to temporary 
disability benefits at this time. 
History of Claim 
Mr. Hardin is a fifty-four year-old resident of Henderson County, Tennessee. He 
worked for Dewayne' s as a "rack line operator," hanging and manipulating metal parts of 
various sizes on a moving production line. He described his work as repetitive and hand-
intensive. For several years prior to the events in question, Mr. Hardin complained of 
arthritic pain in his hands and arms. He testified he related these arthritic problems to his 
supervisor, John McMullen, for several months prior to the medical treatment at issue in 
this case. 
1 Additional information regarding the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Expedited Hearing is attached as 
an Appendix. 
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According to the medical records, Mr. Hardin required hospitalization in 
September 2014, for renal impairment, dehydration, and Type II diabetes. He also 
reported "hand joint pain." The diagnoses of diabetes and hand joint pain continued after 
his hospitalization so Mr. Hardin followed up with his primary care physician, Dr. Kevin 
Stroup, who recommended an EMG study by Dr. Ronald Bingham in Jackson, 
Tennessee. 
On December 29, 2014, Mr. Hardin saw Dr. Bingham and reported a "several year 
history of constant severe bilateral hand and foot numbness." (Ex. 7.) The condition in 
his hands was "exacerbated ... by general use of [his] hands." !d. The testing revealed 
diabetic neuropathy and superimposed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar nerve 
neuropathy at the elbows. !d. On cross-examination, Mr. Hardin testified Dr. Bingham 
advised him that the nerve findings in his arms were the result of his repetitive work at 
Dewayne's. Following the appointment and testing with Dr. Bingham, Mr. Hardin 
provided the medical record from the visit to Mr. McMullen and told Mr. McMullen that 
his arm conditions were work-related. 
After the testing, Dr. Stroup referred Mr. Hardin to Dr. Harold Antwine, an 
orthopedic surgeon in Jackson. In his history to Dr. Antwine on January 6, 2015, Mr. 
Hardin reported a "longstanding history of bilateral hand pain." (Ex. 4.) He told Dr. 
Antwine he had performed the same job for three years, and that he had pain for two of 
those years. Dr. Antwine noted the EMG results and opined that Mr. Hardin may require 
surgery for his nerve entrapments. On January 27, 2015, Dr. Antwine recommended a 
carpal tunnel release and an ulnar nerve transposition on the right arm. Mr. Hardin 
underwent surgery on March 9, 2015. 
On March 3, 2015, Mr. Hardin applied for medical leave at Dewayne's. He 
testified that he did not realize that the documents provided him by· Kay Wood, the 
Human Resources representative, were Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) paperwork 
rather than workers compensation paperwork. He testified Ms. Wood "acted like she did 
not know what he was talking about" when he mentioned reporting his injury to Mr. 
McMullen in December 2014. After approval of FMLA leave, De Wayne's placed Mr. 
Hardin off work since March 9, 20 15 without pay. When his FMLA expired on June 2, 
2015, Dewayne's terminated Mr. Hardin. (Ex. 5.) 
On April 16, 2015, Ms. Wood contacted Mr. Hardin to determine his medical 
status. The next day, April 17, 2015, Mr. Hardin went to Dewayne's and completed an 
accident report. The report noted he was injured on December 2, 2014, while "hanging 
parts." (Ex. 9.) The report further noted he "did not know what to do" in response to the 
question, "why was this injury not reported on the date of injury?" !d. 
Dewayne's carrier completed a First Report of Work Injury and provided a panel 
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of physicians, including Dr. Stroup, in April2015. (Ex. 3.) Mr. Hardin chose Dr. Stroup 
from the panel. There is no proof that Dewayne's, or its carrier, ever set an appointment 
with Dr. Stroup. The carrier denied the claim, asserting that the alleged injuries did not 
arise primarily out of the employment. 
Mr. Hardin filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) on April 16, 2015, 
seeking medical and temporary disability benefits. The parties did not resolve the 
disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediation Specialist filed the Dispute 
Certification Notice on May 15, 20 15. The Court conducted an Expedited Hearing on 
September 3, 2015. Mr. Hardin was the only witness. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, an injury is accidental "only if 
the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and 
in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by time and place of 
occurrence." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014). "An injury 'arises primarily 
out of and in the course and scope of employment' only if it has been shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent 
(50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
102(13)(B) (2014). 
Dewayne's correctly asserts that Mr. Hardin has not shown his injury arose 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment by the medical records in 
evidence. The missing element is medical causation because the medical providers failed 
to provide a favorable causation opinion. However, the lack of a causation opinion is not 
immediately fatal to Mr. Hardin's request for benefits. Enforcing a burden of proving his 
injury by a preponderance of the evidence at an Expedited Hearing would yield the 
unreasonable result of prohibiting Mr. Hardin from receiving medical care for his 
bilateral arm conditions without first securing an expert opinion on medical causation. In 
contrast, our Appeals Board described an employee's burden at an Expedited Hearing as 
follows: 
[A ]n employee need not prove each and every element of his or her claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence at an expedited hearing to be entitled to 
temporary disability or medical benefits, but must instead present evidence 
sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the employee would likely 
prevail at a hearing on the merits in accordance with the express terms of 
section 50-6-239( d)( 1 ). A contrary rule would require many injured 
workers to seek out, obtain, and pay for a medical evaluation or treatment 
before his or her employer would have any obligation to provide medical 
benefits. The delays inherent in such an approach, not to mention the cost 
barrier for many workers, would be inconsistent with a fair, expeditious, 
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and efficient workers' compensation system. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-
1409(b)(2)(A) (2014). 
McCord, at *9-10. 
In this case, Mr. Hardin testified he worked in a repetitive job for Dewayne's for 
several years. Dewayne's required him to handle, move, and hang metal parts on a 
moving line. Dr. Antwine noted that Mr. Hardin performed the same employment duties 
for two years. On December 29, 2014, Dr. Bingham diagnosed him with peripheral 
neuropathy, likely secondary to his diabetes. However, Dr. Bingham also noted that it 
was his "opinion that [Mr. Hardin] is likely suffering from superimposed entrapment of 
the median nerve at both wrists and the ulnar nerve at both elbows." (Ex. 7.) At the 
Expedited Hearing, Dewayne's counsel elicited testimony from Mr. Hardin regarding 
who might have told him his carpal tunnel was work-related. Mr. Hardin responded that 
Dr. Bingham told him as much.2 This bolsters the written opinion of Dr. Bingham that 
Mr. Hardin has superimposed entrapment on his diabetic peripheral neuropathy. 
Dewayne's argues that Mr. Hardin's purported delay in reporting any injury is an 
indication that the injury is not work-related. In other words, because Mr. Harding had 
issues for several years, and elected to apply for FMLA benefits, he tacitly admitted his 
condition was not work-related. He only asserted a work-relation by the filing of the PBD 
in April 2015. The Court rejects Dewayne's argument. Tennessee Code Annot"ated 
section 50-6-20l(b) (2014) provides: 
In those cases where the injuries occur as the result of gradual or 
cumulative events or trauma, . then the injured employee or the injured 
employee's representative shall provide notice of the injury to the employer 
within thirty (30) days after the employee: 
( 1) Knows or reasonably should know that the employee has suffered a 
work-related injury that has resulted in permanent physical impairment; or 
(2) Is rendered unable to continue to perform the employee's normal work 
activities as the result of the work-related injury and the employee knows or 
reasonably should know that the injury was caused by work-related 
activities. 
Thus, employees who suffer gradually occurring injuries are relieved from the 
notice requirement until- they know or reasonably should know that their injury was 
caused by their work and that the injury has either impaired them permanently or has 
prevented them from performing normal work activities. Banks v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 170 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tenn. 2005). Additionally, an employee who sustains a 
2 Dewayne's, after Mr. Hardin answered its question, objected to the response as being hearsay. The Court overruled 
said objection and noted that Dewayne's counsel solicited Mr. Hardin's response. Notwithstanding, the answer is 
not dispositive to the ultimate finding herein, that Mr. Hardin is entitled to further evaluation as to causation. 
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gradually occurring injury may be unsure of the cause of his injury and therefore relieved 
of the notice requirement until a physician confirms the diagnosis. !d. (citing Whirlpool 
Corp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 169 (Tenn. 2002)). 
In this case, Mr. Hardin testified, without contradiction, that he reported his injury 
to Mr. McMullen, his supervisor, on December 29, 2014. Mr. Hardin, suffering from a 
gradually occurring injury, need not have reported sooner. By statute and case law, he 
was relieved from reporting until he learned of his diagnosis on December 29, 2014, the 
date he was diagnosed with carpal tunnel by Dr. Bingham. Likewise, considering the 
uncontroverted testimony that Dr. Bingham indicated a work-relation to Mr. Hardin, 
December 29, 2014, was also the first time that Mr. Hardin had knowledge of his 
diagnosis having a possible relation to his work. Dewayne's concedes that it can show no 
prejudice by any alleged late reporting. The Court agrees and finds that Mr. Hardin gave 
adequate notice of an injury. 
The Court finds Mr. Hardin credible. Regardless, Dewayne's offered no 
countervailing testimony to refute his description of his reporting of the injury to both 
Mr. McMullen and Ms. Wood. 
Medical benefits 
When an employee reports an injury, Tennessee law requires an employer to 
provide "free of charge to the employee such medical and surgical treatment ... made 
reasonably necessary by accident as defined in this chapter[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
204(a)(l)(A) (2014). "The nature and extent of an employee's injuries, and the issue of 
medical causation, usually come to light in the course of treatment of the employee's 
injuries." Quaker Oats v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tenn. 1978). Here, having reported 
an injury, Mr. Hardin is entitled to evaluation of same. The approved physician might 
then opine as to the cause of his condition. Thus, he has yet to present sufficient evidence 
from which the Court might conclude he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on 
the issue of outstanding medical bills. In the absence of an opinion as to causation, the 
Court cannot order payment of any outstanding medical bills for treatment rendered to 
Mr. Hardin to date. 
Temporary disability benefits 
Temporary total disability (TTD) is payable to an injured employee who is totally 
disabled to work by her injury and while she is recovering as far as the nature of the 
injury permits. Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tenn. 2000). Under 
Tennessee law, to establish entitlement to temporary total benefits, the employee must 
show he was "(1) totally disabled to work by a compensable injury; (2) that there was a 
causal connection between the injury and his inability to work; and (3) the duration of 
that period of disability." !d.; Jewell v. Cobble Construction and Arcus Restoration, No. 
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2014-05-003, 2015 TN Work. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *21 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. 
App. Bd. Jan. 12, 2015). When an employee demonstrates the ability to return to work or 
attains maximum medical improvement, then TTD benefits are terminated. Simpson v. 
Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. 1978); Jewell, at 21. 
Temporary partial disability (TPD) refers to the time during which the injured 
employee is able to resume some gainful employment but has not yet reached maximum 
recovery. Williams v. Saturn Corp., No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 
1032, at *3 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Nov. 15, 2005). As with TTD, there must be 
adequate proof of a causal connection between the injury and the disability for an award 
ofTPD. 
To date, Mr. Hardin has not shown by expert medical evidence a causal 
connection between his injuries and his inability to work. Although Dewayne' s does not 
contest the period of temporary disability or Mr. Hardin's inability to work during that 
period, the requirement of causation has yet to be satisfied. Thus, he has yet to present 
sufficient evidence from which the Court might conclude he is likely to prevail at a 
hearing on the merits on the issue of temporary disability benefits. Mr. Hardin would be 
entitled to temporary disability benefits from March 13, 2015, forward and ongoing, 
should an authorized treating physician opine a causal connection between his work and 
his disability. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Dewayne's or Accident Fund shall provide Mr. Hardin with medical treatment for 
his injuries as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 (2014), to 
be initiated by Dewayne's or Accident Fund providing Mr. Hardin with a panel of 
physicians as required by statute to evaluate Mr. Hardin and render an opinion as 
to the causation of his bilateral arm injuries. Dewayne's may again tender the 
original panel to Mr. Hardin or present a new panel for selection of the approved 
provider. Medical bills shall be furnished to Accident Fund by Mr. Hardin or the 
medical providers. 
2. Mr. Hardin's claim for payment of outstanding medical bills is denied at this time. 
3. Mr. Hardin's claim for temporary disability benefits is denied at this time. 
4. This matter is set for a Scheduling Hearing on November 17, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. 
Central Time. 
5. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, 
compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven business days 
from the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code 
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Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3) (2014). The Insurer or Self-Insured 
Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the 
seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the 
necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a 
penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
6. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers' Compensation 
Compliance Unit via email W Compliance. Program c ,tn.gov or by calling (615) 
253-1471 or (615) 532-1309. 
ENTERED this the 2"d day of Oc o 
Judge Allen Philli s 
Court of Workers' Co 
Initial Hearing: 
A Scheduling Hearing has been set with Judge Allen Phillips, Court of 
Workers' Compensation Claims. You must call 731-422-5263 or toll-free at 855-543-
5038 to participate in the Initial Hearing. 
Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation. All conferences are set using Central Time (CT). 
Right to Appeal: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: '"Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the 
date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
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4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be 
made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of 
Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal, 
may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the 
purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it 
with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited 
Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of 
the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing 
Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and 
accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers' Compensation 
Claims and must be approved by the workers' compensation judge before the 
record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. 
6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within 
three business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of 
the evidence, specifYing the issues presented for review and including any 
argument in support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if 
any, with the Court Clerk within three business days of the filing of the appellant's 
position statement. All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an 
interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the 
case from the evidence admitted during the Expedited Hearing; (2) a statement 
summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the Expedited Hearing; (3) a 
statement of the issue( s) presented for review; and ( 4) an argument, citing 
appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order was 
sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the211.<tday of 
October, 2015. 
Certified 
Name Mail 
Chris Hardin, 
Em_Q_loyee 
Gordon Aulgar, Esq. 
Em_Qloyer's Attorney 
Via Via 
Fax Email Service sent to: 
110 Rose Lawn Dr., 
X Lexington, TN 38351 
X Gordon.aulg~r@accidentfund.com 
Penny Shn'r~ Clerk of Court 
Court of Wipfkcrs' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtCierk@tn.gov 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibits: 
1. Wage Statement 
2. First Report of injury, June 17, 2015 
3. C42 Panel ofPhysicians 
4. Medical Records of Dr. Harold Antwine 
5. March 18, 2015 letter from Kay Wood 
6. Choice ofPhysicians, April21, 2015 
7. Collective Bills from Jackson Madison County General Hospital, West TN Bone 
and Joint, Professional Anesthesia Associates, Bingham EMG Clinics, and Willow 
Emergency Physicians, 
8. Medical Records of Dr. Ronald Bingham 
9. Application for Family Medical Leave Act. 
10. Employee's Injury Report, April 16, 2015 
11. Mr. Hardin's Job Description 
12. Medical Records of Dr. Stroup 
Technical record: 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination, June 11, 2015 
2. Dispute Certification Notice, July 27, 2015 
3. Request for Expedited Hearing, July 27, 20153 
3 The Court did not consider attachments to Technical Record filings unless admitted into evidence during the 
Expedited Hearing. The Court considered factual statements in these filings or any attachments to them as 
allegations unless established by the evidence. 
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